and estate values and the data has been submitted to various statistical tests (see Appendix 2). Of the seven towns studied, five show a statistically significant difference between the average wealth of the "yea" voters and the average wealth of the "nay" voters. (See Table 2 .) In Exeter, Hopkinton, Little Compton, Portsmouth, and Tiverton, those who favored ratification were clearly wealthier than those who opposed it -sometimes more than twice as wealthy. In Jamestown and Middletown, the sample size is too small to respond to statistical tests. The Tiverton data (see Table 3 ) specifically pinpoint personal estate wealth as the major division between pro-ratification and anti-ratification groups. Alone among the usable tax records, the Tiverton tax books divide the taxes into subcategories of personal estate (livestock, farm and 4 household goods, shop inventories, slaves, securities, hard money) and real estate (land and houses). The results of separate analyses on these two subcategories show that the average "yea" voter possessed five times as much personal estate as the average "nay" voter and more than twice as much personal estate as the average taxpayer. Similarly, the "yea" voters paid significantly more real estate tax than the "nay" voters did. The Tiverton data indicate that those who rejected ratification were, on the whole, middling landholders who had little else beside that land. In contrast, those who favored ratification were, on the whole, large landholders who also possessed significant personal estates as well.
The simple means for all seven towns in every tax or estate valuation show that "yea" voters were wealthier than "nay" voters. Although the statistical significance of the differences in wealth holds for only five of the seven towns, the data leave the consistent and overwhelming impression that pro-ratification freemen were far wealthier than anti-ratification freemen. And while the Rhode Island voter data does not necessarily apply to other states, the data supports a theory already advanced and buttressed by other, wider evidence: Charles Beard's argument that those who favored the Constitution were wealthier, particularly in personal (non-real) estate, than those opposed to the Constitution.
I. Origins of This Essay
This essay is the product of a long discussion between a social historian (Ruth Herndon) working in a history department and an economic historian (John Murray) working in an economics department. John died in the spring of 2018, bringing our collaboration to a close, and I (Ruth Herndon) have written the final version of this essay after his death, using notes that 5 John left (often in emails) indicating his vision for the project. That vision rested on the interplay of history and economics, languages that John spoke and wrote with ease.
John Murray and I met when we were both at the University of Toledo (1996 Toledo ( -2007 .
From our earliest conversations, John made it clear that he considered himself an historian as well as an economist, and he held himself to the scholarly standards of both disciplines. He interpreted economic data and put it to work in the service of history. He read history and put it to work in the service of economics. He understood these different audiences and shaped our collaborative projects to appeal to both historians and economists.
Over the years we worked together on numerous projects, most of them focusing on poor people and children in early America. We had our niches of specialization: John studied South Carolina; I studied New England. We gave papers together on the same conference panels, applied jointly for external grants, co-authored book chapters and a journal article, and co-edited 
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The struggles between debtor and creditor interests rapidly assumed political forms.
Paper money advocates swept the annual election of 1786; freemen, eager for economic relief, voted out the mercantile coalition that had controlled the state legislature in the preceding years.
The new legislators, forming a Country party, had pledged to support paper money, and they were as good as their word. In 1786, the Rhode Island General Assembly passed paper money 38 On Rhode Island's paper money crisis, see Polishook, Union; John Paul Kaminski, " Meanwhile, the General Assembly continued to enact legislation based on paper money. The result was a virtual polarization in the populace: the largest merchants drew into one camp; the majority of the farmers into the other. This was the hostile political environment entered by the new Constitution.
Before the Constitutional Convention of 1787, some political observers had viewed Rhode Island's factionalism as proof of the need for a strong federal government to check the excessive democracy of the states. The dispute over paper money strengthened this opinion.
Angry merchant creditors did nothing to disabuse outsiders of the distorted notion that Rhode
Island was on the brink of chaos and anarchy, while the interests of the minority (that is, the merchants) went unheeded. constitution." 42 The official record shows no mention of a ratifying convention, which Congress had specified when it sent the Constitution on to the states.
Arriving in the midst of the paper-money controversy, the Federal Constitution immediately provided a new focus for old antagonisms. The debate over ratification was heated and vituperative. Some who wanted the Constitution questioned the moral character of those who did not; and some who rejected the Constitution attacked the motives of their opponents.
Some merchants thought that debtors rejected a stronger federal government because it would prevent them from solving their financial problems through paper money. Some struggling farmers feared that new Constitution would establish "iron government," ignoring their local concerns and destroying liberty. I have formed this as my Opinion. 1. That it is not the most pfect Constitution yet 2. That it is a very good one, & that it is advisable to adopt it. However 3. That tho' much of it will be pmanent & lasting, yet much of it will be hereafter altered by future Revisions. And 4. That the best one remains yet to be investigated.
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Those who felt strongly that the Constitution was necessary, the Federalists, were concentrated in Newport and Providence, where they used the press as a means of conveying their enthusiasm for ratification and their sarcasm against those who resisted. They also had a In the February 1788 session, the General Assembly ignored Federalists demands for a ratifying convention and instead voted to call a popular referendum to decide the issue. The
Federalists were outraged, claiming that the towns were controlled by "town bosses." 45 The
Antifederalist majority in the Assembly was unmoved, perhaps sensitive to the charges of bullying and manipulation in the Pennsylvania ratifying convention that had appeared on the front pages of Rhode Island newspapers. 46 The General Assembly issued an order for the referendum; and on 24 March 1788, every town in Rhode Island held a town meeting for the express purpose of hearing the voice of the freemen on the issue of ratification. The results of these votes (Table 1) were submitted to the general assembly at their session on the last Monday in March 1788.
Federalists boycotted the balloting, a measure that was particularly effective in Newport and Providence (see Table 1 ). John Kaminski has argued that the boycott was meant to conceal the Federalists' weakness and has asserted that even if all the Federalists in Providence and Newport had voted, they still would have received "fewer than half the total votes of the Antifederalists." 47 Kaminski has suggested that the Antifederalists also stayed away from the referendum in Newport and Providence, fearing social and economic repercussions. by the town leaders against the pro-ratification vote by all voters. Town leaders, it appears, were significantly more pro-ratification than other voters (Table 4) . I also tested for a significant difference of wealth between town leaders and other voters, looking for a connection between greater wealth among town leaders and greater pro-ratification sentiment. In line with Edward
Cook's assertion that wealth was not the primary qualification for town leaders in eighteenthcentury New England, 57 the computations show that there was a significant difference of wealth between town leaders and voters in only three of the six towns: Exeter, Middletown, and Tiverton (Table 4) .
This greater wealth did not neatly correlate to vote on ratification, however. Exeter's town leaders, significantly wealthier than the voters, showed no pro-ratification strength at all:
they registered a unanimous rejection of the Constitution (Table 4) . Similarly, Tiverton's town leaders, significantly wealthier than the voters, showed less pro-ratification strength than the voters (Table 4) . Middletown is the only town which shows a positive correlation between both greater wealth and stronger pro-ratification vote. But Middletown's statistics are themselves suspect: half the town leaders did not vote, and the resulting computations are based on a small sample size of five ( In their 1984 study, McGuire and Ohsfeldt looked specifically at slaveholding as a factor and discovered that "delegates with a large share of their assets in the form of slaves were significantly less likely to vote for the Constitution than were those with no slaves." 64 In fact, slaveholders were the one possible exception to their general conclusion that Beard was right about the "division of interests" at the ratifying conventions, since slaveowners generally opposed the Constitution. 65 In contrast, Heckelman and Dougherty, in their 2013 study, found 8 out of 9 voted in Exeter; 0 voted to ratify 3 out of 7 voted in Jamestown; 1 voted to ratify 7 out of 9 voted in Little Compton; 6 voted to ratify 5 out of 9 voted in Middletown; 3 voted to ratify 5 out of 9 voted in Portsmouth; 1 voted to ratify 6 out of 9 voted in Tiverton; 1 voted to ratify Note 2: The sources of wealth data are as follows: Exeter 1787 tax; Jamestown 1788 tax; Little Compton 1798 tax; Middletown 1783 tax; Portsmouth 1783 estate valuation; Tiverton 1788 tax.
